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I. INTRODUCTION
One union's refusal to cross the picket lines of another union-the
sympathy strike-has been the cause of much litigation both in the
courts and before the National Labor Relations Board. This term
the United States Supreme Court has agreed to hear argument on
such a case, Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers.' The Court's
decision in this case will determine whether a federal district
court has authority under § 301(a) of the Labor-Management Rela-
tions Act of 1947 (LMRA)2 to enjoin a strike where the contract
contains both a no-strike clause and a mandatory arbitration proce-
dure and the union strikes solely out of deference to a lawful picket
line, or whether § 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 19321 precludes
issuance of injunctive relief.
* Georgetown University; A.B., University of Detroit (1964); J.D., University of Southern
California (1966); Assistant Counsel for The Firestone Tire & Rubber Company, Akron, Ohio;
Professor, College of Business, Kent State University.
* * A.B., Regis University (1971); J.D., University of Mississippi (1973); Attorney with
Berry, Moorman, King, Lott & Cook, Detroit, Michigan.
1. 386 F. Supp. 405 (W.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd, 517 F.2d 1207 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. granted,
44 U.S.L.W. 3238 (U.S. Oct. 20, 1975) (No. 75-339).
2. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1970) provides:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization repre-
senting employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or
between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the
United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in
controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
3. 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1970) provides:
No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order
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This article will examine several aspects of the problem of sympa-
thy strikes to determine the respective rights and obligations of
employers and unions including:
(a) the right of an employer to obtain a Boys Markets' injunc-
tion in a sympathy strike situation;
(b) an employer's right to damages where the union with
which he has a contract has refused to cross a picket line;
(c) a union's liability for any damages in such a situation;
(d) recovery of damages under §§ 3011 and 3036 of the LMRA;
and
(e) the right of an employer to discipline or discharge employ-
ees who refuse to cross picket lines.
II. BACKGROUND RELATIVE TO Boys Markets INJUNCTIONS
The most critical question in the sympathy strike area is the
or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of any labor
dispute to prohibit any person or persons participating or interested in such dispute
(as these terms are herein defined) from doing, whether singly or in concert, any of
the following acts:
(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any relation of
employment;
(b) Becoming or remaining a member of any labor organization or of any
employer organization, regardless of any such undertaking or promise as is
described in section 103 of this title;
(c) Paying or giving to, or withholding from, any person participating or
interested in such labor dispute, any strike or unemployment benefits or insur-
ance, or other moneys or things of value;
(d) By all lawful means aiding any person participating or interested in any
labor dispute who is being proceeded against in, or is prosecuting, any action or
suit in any court of the United States or of any State;
(e) Giving publicity to the existence of, or the facts involved in, any labor
dispute, whether by advertising, speaking, patrolling, or by any other method
not involving fraud or violence;
(f) Assembling peaceably to act or to organize to act in promotion of their
interests in a labor dispute;
(g) Advising or notifying any person of an intention to do any of the acts
heretofore specified;
(h) Agreeing with other persons to do or not to do any of the acts heretofore
specified; and
(i) Advising, urging, or otherwise causing or inducing without fraud or vio-
lence the acts heretofore specified, regardless of any such undertaking or prom-
ise as is described in section 103 of this title.
4. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
5. 29 U.S.C. § 185(e) (1970).
6. Id. § 187(b).
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propriety of a district court injunction prohibiting a union and its
members from honoring another union's picket line. Of central im-
portance to such an inquiry is, of course, the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Boys Markets. However, that decision cannot be read in a
vacuum, divorced from the reasons behind it.
The primary thrust of Boys Markets was the accomodation of two
fundamental principles of national labor policy: nonintervention by
federal courts in labor disputes and resolution of such disputes
through arbitration. The first of these is embodied in the Norris-
LaGuardia Act7 which resulted from abuses succinctly character-
ized by Mr. Justice Brennan as "the at-largeness of federal judges
in enjoining activities thought to seek 'unlawful ends' or to consti-
tute 'unlawful means' . . ." The second axiom of national labor
policy, the resolution of industrial disputes through arbitration, was
first articulated in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills.9
Therein, the Supreme Court held that § 301 of the LMRA created
federal substantive rights to secure enforcement of collective bar-
gaining agreements and established that the law to be applied under
§ 301 was federal law to be fashioned from national labor policy.
The status of labor unions at the time Norris-LaGuardia was
enacted and the status of labor unions today are quite different.
Recognition of the difference in the labor movement of today and
the labor movement of the late 1920's and the early 1930's is ex-
pressed in the Supreme Court's decision in Boys Markets:
In 1932 Congress attempted to bring some order out of the
industrial chaos that had developed and to correct the abuses
that had resulted from the interjection of the federal judiciary
into union-management disputes on the behalf of manage-
ment. 0
Considered in this perspective, and particularly in view of the ac-
commodation reached between the nonintervention policy and that
favoring arbitration," the Supreme Court's decision in Boys
7. Id. §§ 101-15.
8. Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 219 (1962) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
See also Milk Wagon Drivers' Local 753 v. Lake Valley Farm Products, Inc., 311 U.S. 91
(1940); F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE- THE LABOR INJUNcTION (1930); Vladeck, Boys Markets
And National Labor Policy, 24 VAND. L. REV. 93, 94 (1970).
9. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
10. 398 U.S. at 251.
11. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago River & Indiana R.R., 353 U.S. 30 (1957).
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Markets is hardly surprising. Boys Markets holds that federal courts
can enjoin strikes arising over grievances which are subject to the
grievance and arbitration provision of a collective bargaining agree-
ment. The Court in Boys Markets recognized that the Norris-
LaGuardia Act was directed "to a situation totally different from
that which exists today" and that it was possible to accommodate
the principles of Norris-LaGuardia with the emerging federal com-
mon law being developed under § 301. Prior case law was viewed by
the Court as "seriously undermin[ing] the effectiveness of the arbi-
tration technique as a method peacefully to resolve industrial dis-
putes without resort to strikes, lockouts, and similar devices."' 2 As
the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has noted, Boys Markets
evidences that the "policy in favor of enforcing the settlement of
labor disputes through compulsory arbitration emerged domi-
nant.",
3
The Supreme Court, beginning with the Steelworkers Trilogy, 4
has repeatedly viewed arbitration as "a kingpin of federal labor
policy"' 5 and the preferred mechanism for resolving disputes under
collective bargaining agreements. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit noted" that "since Lincoln Mills, it has been increasingly
clear that arbitration is the central institution for the administra-
tion of the collective bargaining contract."' 7 Indeed, arbitration has
come to be viewed as the terminal point for disputes arising in the
collective bargaining process. Illustrative of this is the fact that an
estimated 94% of all collective bargaining agreements contain arbi-
tration procedures. 8 The policy is likewise in accord with congres-
12. 398 U.S. at 252. In Boys Markets, the Court specifically overruled Sinclair Refining
Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195 (1962).
13. Avco Corp. v. Local 787, UAW, 459 F.2d 968, 971 (3d Cir. 1972).
14. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v.
American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
15. Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 226 (1962) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
See also Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 105 (1962) (national labor policy
is "to promote the arbitral process as a substitute for economic warfare").
16. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Communications Workers Local 6222, 454 F.2d 1333
(5th Cir. 1971).
17. Id. at 1336. Compare the statement of the Court in Boys Markets:
Indeed, the very purpose of arbitration procedures is to provide a mechanism for the
expeditious settlement of industrial disputes without resort to strikes, lockouts, or
other self-help measures.
398 U.S. at 249.
18. D. BOK & H. DUNLOP, LABOR AND THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY 220-21 (1970). See also H.
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sional intentions expressed in the Labor-Management Relations
A ct. I
The goal of national labor policy to promote the peaceful resolu-
tion of disputes through arbitration is emphasized in Boys Markets'
recognition that the sine qua non for injunctive relief is the existence
of a strike caused by a dispute subject to resolution under grievance
and arbitration procedures established in a collective bargaining
agreement. Issuing an injunction and ordering arbitration in such a
case works no injustice since both the employer and the union will
have their claims determined by the tribunal which the parties have
agreed was most competent and appropriate to interpret the provi-
sions of the collective agreement." Thus, in a Boys Markets case the
court is simply enforcing the bargain struck between the parties.2
This foundation of Boys Markets was recently buttressed in
Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW.22 The Supreme Court, in upholding a
district court injunction against a strike over a mine safety dispute,
found that in the absence of an express contract exclusion, such a
dispute was subject to arbitration under the principles of the
Steelworkers Trilogy." In light of this finding, the Court, relying on
its decision in Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co.,24 held an
injunction was proper even in the absence of a contractual no-strike
WELLINGTON, LABOR AND THE LEGAL PROCESS 94-95 (1968).
19. Section 203(d) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1970),
declares:
Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is declared to be the
desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the application or
interpretation of an existing collective-bargaining agreement.
20. 398 U.S. at 253 n.22.
21. Granting an injunction in such a case does not offend the policies of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act since "the Union is not subjected in this fashion to judicially created limita-
tions on its freedom of action but is simply compelled to comply with limitations to which it
has previously agreed." ABA LABOR RELATIONS LAW SECTION 226, 242 (1963), REPORT OF
SPECIAL Atkinson-Sinclair COMMITTEE, cited with approval in Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail
Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 253 n.22 (1970). See also Milk Wagon Drivers Local 753 v.
Lake Valley Farm Products, Inc., 311 U.S. 91, 101 (1940).
22. 414 U.S. 368 (1974).
23. In rejecting resort to economic warfare, the Court stated:
We also disagree with the implicit assumption that the alternative to arbitration holds
greater promise for the protection of employees. Relegating safety disputes to the arena
of economic combat offers no greater assurance that the ultimate resolution will ensure
employee safety. Indeed the safety of the workshop would then depend on the relative
economic strength of the parties rather than on an informed and impartial assessment
of the facts.
Id. at 379.
24. 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
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clause-on the ground that an implied no-strike clause, coterminous
with the parties' commitment to arbitrate, would support injunctive
relief.25 This broad affirmation of Boys Markets has great signifi-
cance in the sympathy strike situation, as will be discussed below.
Ill. THE APPLICABILITY OF Boys Markets TO SYMPATHY
STRIKES
In light of Boys Markets, one of the most vexing problems facing
federal courts is whether injunctive relief should be granted in sym-
pathy strike situations. Decisions on this issue show the problems
faced by federal courts in interpreting the language of the Supreme
Court's decision in Boys Markets, where injunctive relief is limited
to cases where the strike is over a grievance both parties are contrac-
tually bound to resolve under procedures set forth in a collective
bargaining agreement. Federal courts have taken diverse views as
to whether a sympathy strike falls within the ambit of the Supreme
Court's decision. 2 Two distinct lines of court of appeals cases have
developed on this issue. One line27 follows the proposition that the
honoring of another union's picket line is not enjoinable since the
strike is not "over a grievance." The other line2 holds that the Boys
Markets rationale is applicable to sympathy strikes. Buffalo Forge,
the case in which the Supreme Court has granted certiorari this
25. 414 U.S. at 381.
26. Contradictory rulings persist although it is clear that the Supreme Court has found
that a refusal to cross a stranger union's picket line constitutes a violation of a collective
bargaining agreement's no-strike obligation. NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co., 345 U.S.
71 (1953).
27. Plain Dealer Publishing Co. v. Cleveland Typographical Union No. 53, 520 F.2d 1220
(6th Cir. 1975), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3239 (U.S. Oct. 2, 1975) (No. 75-565);
Hyster Co. v. Independent Towing & Lifting Mach. Ass'n, 519 F.2d 89 (7th Cir. 1975), petition
for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3253 (U.S. Oct. 6, 1975) (No. 75-524); Buffalo Forge Co. v. United
Steelworkers, 386 F. Supp. 405 (W.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd, 517 F.2d 1207 (2d Cir. 1975), cert.
granted, 44 U.S.L.W. 3238 (U.S. Oct. 20, 1975) (No. 75-339).
28. Associated Gen. Contractors v. Construction & Gen. Laborers Local 563, 519 F.2d 269
(8th Cir. 1975); Valmac Industries, Inc. v. Food Handlers Local 425, 519 F.2d 263 (8th Cir.
1975), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3280 (U.S. Oct. 31, 1975) (No. 75-647); Island Creek
Coal Co. v. UMW, 507 F.2d 650 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3206 (U.S. Oct. 6,
1975) (No. 74-1573); Armco Steel Corp. v. UMW, 505 F.2d 1129 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
44 U.S.L.W. 3206 (U.S. Oct. 6, 1975) (No. 74-1574); NAPA Pittsburgh, Inc. v. Automotive
Chauffeurs Local 926, 502 F.2d 321 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1049 (1974); Wilmington
Shipping Co. v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 86 L.R.R.M. 2846 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1022 (1974); Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc. v. Teamsters Local 391, 497 F.2d
311 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974); Monongahela Power Co. v. Local 2332,
IBEW, 484 F.2d 1209 (4th Cir. 1973).
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term, follows the former line of reasoning; but petitions for certiorari
are currently pending in two other cases 9 which follow the latter line
of reasoning.
A. Decisions Which Have Denied Boys Markets Relief
One of the earliest decisions in which Boys Markets relief was held
inapplicable to a sympathy strike was Amstar Corp. v. Amalga-
mated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen.3 There some of the
company's refineries had collective bargaining agreements with the
International Longshoremen's Association (ILA) and some had
agreements with the Meat Cutters. The Meat Cutters and ILA
agreements had different expiration dates. After the ILA began a
strike against the company, ILA pickets appeared at the company's
New Orleans refinery where the employees were represented by the
Meat Cutters. The presence of these pickets precipitated a work
stoppage by the Meat Cutters and the company sought injunctive
relief, which the district court granted. 3'
On appeal, 32 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed.
The appellate court read Boys Markets to require a finding that the
strike was directly caused by a grievance against the company.
Applying this reasoning to the sympathy strike situation, the court
held that injunctive relief was improper since the strike was not
'"over a grievance" but rather was caused by the presence of another
union's picket line. Implicit in the Fifth Circuit's opinion was the
concern that granting injunctive relief in the sympathy strike situa-
tion would open the door to injunctive relief in every situation where
a no-strike clause was allegedly violated. Indeed, the court noted
that if injunctive relief were granted in the context of a sympathy
strike, it would be difficult to ascertain when such relief would be
29. Hyster Co. v. Independent Towing & Lifting Mach. Ass'n, 519 F.2d 89 (7th Cir. 1975),
petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3253 (U.S. Oct. 6, 1975) (No. 75-524); Plain Dealer
Publishing Co. v. Cleveland Typographical Union No. 53, 520 F.2d 1220 (6th Cir. 1975),
petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3239 (U.S. Oct. 2, 1975) (No. 75-565).
30. 468 F.2d 1372 (5th Cir.), rev'g 337 F. Supp. 810 (E.D. La. 1972).
31. 337 F. Supp. 810 (E.D. La. 1972). The district court found that a dispute existed
between the company and union as to whether or not the honoring of the ILA picket line
violated the no-strike clause in the collective bargaining agreement. Since the collective
bargaining agreement contained broad grievance, arbitration, and no-strike clauses, under
the view of the district court, the union was bound to arbitrate the issue of whether its
members had the right to honor the picket line.
32. 468 F.2d 1372 (5th Cir. 1972).
1976
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unavailable, citing for this proposition a decision of the Third Cir-
cuit3 3 which held that a breach of a no-strike clause was not in and
of itself grounds for injunctive relief.
A similar concern was expressed by the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit in the Buffalo Forge case. In that case, the district
court had denied an injunction against a work stoppage by produc-
tion and maintenance employees who were. honoring the picket lines
of sister locals which represented office, clerical, and technical em-
ployees of the same employer at a common site. Placing heavy reli-
ance upon the narrowness of the exception to § 4 of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act established in Boys Markets, the Second Circuit
concluded that "only strikes over a grievance which the union has
agreed to arbitrate are within the scope of the exception."34 After
finding that the strike in question was not over a grievance but
rather was merely deference to a lawful picket line by other union
members, the court concluded that this distinction was crucial in
light of the need, recognized in Boys Markets,35 to reconcile the anti-
injunction policy of Norris-LaGuardia with the pro-arbitration pol-
icy of the LMRA. 6 Thus, the Second Circuit affirmed the district
court's denial of injunctive relief finding that the lower court's rec-
onciliation of § 4 of Norris-LaGuardia with § 301(a) of the LMRA
comported with the Boys Markets decision. To do otherwise, the
court implied, would be to read into § 301(a) a repeal of § 4.37
33. Parade Publications, Inc. v. Philadelphia Mailers Local 14, 459 F.2d 369 (3d Cir.
1972).
34. 517 F.2d at 1210 (emphasis in original).
35. This distinction was also recognized in Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195,
219 (1962) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
36. The court continued:
If a strike not seeking redress of any grievance is enjoinable, then the policy of Norris-
LaGuardia is virtually obliterated. For since a no-strike provision, if not in fact present
in the employment contract, will be implied where the agreement sets up mandatory
arbitration machinery . ..it is, as the Fifth Circuit has concluded, "difficult to con-
ceive of any strike which could not be so enjoined." . . . Undue expansion of the
"narrow" holding in Boys Market [sic] may be avoided, on the other hand, by proper
attention to the actual threat posed by strikes not over grievances with the employer
to the policies promoted by § 301(a). A strike not seeking to pressure the employer to
yield on a disputed issue is not an attempt to circumvent arbitration machinery estab-
lished by the collective bargaining agreement. Accordingly, it does no violence to the
federal pro-arbitration policy to require federal courts to refrain from enjoining such
strikes.
517 F.2d at 1211.
37. As noted earlier, the Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Buffalo Forge. There
are two additional cases with similar factual patterns in which petitions for certiorari have
Vol. 14: 121
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In Plain Dealer Publishing Co. v. Cleveland Typographical Union
No. 53,3s the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the
district court's denial of an injunction against the refusal by three
been filed but upon which the Court has not yet acted.
In the first case, Hyster Co. v. Independent Towing & Lifting Mach. Ass'n, 519 F.2d 89
(7th Cir. 1975), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3253 (U.S. Oct. 6, 1975) (No. 75-524),
the plaintiff company had plants in three cities and the employees at each plant were repre-
sented by a different union. When the contract expired between the company and one of the
unions, a strike ensued and the union picketed the plants in the other two cities. The employ-
ees at those locations honored the picket lines and the employer sought and was granted
injunctions against the sympathy strikes at those two locations.
In reversing the district court, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit had to reconcile
two conflicting earlier decisions of the same circuit involving sympathy strikes. In the first of
these prior decisions, Inland Steel Co. v. Local 1545, UMW, 505 F.2d 293 (7th Cir. 1974), the
issuance of an injunction against a sympathy strike was affirmed by a divided court on the
basis that the dispute was within the scope of the "exceptionally broad" arbitration clause
of the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1971. Although that agreement did not
contain a no-strike clause, the existence of such a clause was implied on the basis of the
Supreme Court's decision in Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368, 380-84 (1974).
In the second prior decision, Gary Hobart Water Corp. v. NLRB, 511 F.2d 284 (7th Cir.
1975), the breadth of the arbitration clause again furnished the basis for the court's decision.
Unlike the somewhat more restricted clause in Inland Steel which provided for arbitration of
(1) "differences ... as to the meaning and application of the provisions of this agreement,"
(2) "differences . . . about matters not specifically mentioned in this agreement" and (3)
"any local trouble of any kind," 519 F.2d at 91, the clause in Gary Hobart applied to "any
and all disputes and controversies arising under or in connection with the terms of provisions"
of the contract. 511 F.2d at 288. While the no-strike provision of the agreement provided that
there would be no lockouts by the company and that there would be "no strike, stoppages of
work or any other form of interference with the production or other operations of the Company
by the Union or its members," id. at 287, the court held that this did not constitute a
waiver of the right to refuse to cross lawful picket lines and, therefore, concluded that en-
gaging in a sympathy strike was not a dispute or controversy arising under or in connection
with the first union's agreement and was, therefore, neither arbitrable nor subject to the
no-strike provision. Id. at 288. Since the no-strike clause then before the Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit in the Hyster case did not contain a limitation similar to that in
Gary Hobart nor was it as all-encompassing as Inland Steel's provision covering "differ-
ences . . . about matters not specifically mentioned in this agreement," the court ruled that
the Hyster provision was closest to that in Gary Hobart and found the dispute to be non-
arbitrable. Although the court specifically recognized the presumption of arbitrability set
forth in Gateway Coal, similar to that in Buffalo Forge, it found that Boys Markets estab-
lished a narrow exception to § 4 of Norris-LaGuardia only where the work stoppage was " 'over
a grievance' which the parties were contractually bound to arbitrate" and not, as here, where
the work stoppage "itself precipitated the dispute."
It is noteworthy that in Buffalo Forge, the presumption in favor of arbitrability set forth
in Gateway Coal was never addressed, whereas in Hyster it was specifically cited but rejected
on the basis of the "very limited exception" to Norris-LaGuardia established by Boys
Markets.
38. 520 F.2d 1220 (6th Cir. 1975), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3239 (U.S. Oct. 2,
1975) (No. 75-565). This is the second case in the line of Buffalo Forge cases in which petitions
for certiorari are currently pending before the Supreme Court. See note 37 supra.
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unions to cross the lawful picket lines of a fourth union engaged in
a strike against their common employer. It did so "for the reasons
set forth in the district court's opinion."3 The district court had
concluded that the Amstar rationale" was "the sounder view."',
Injunctive relief was denied because the court viewed the situation
as "a dispute which results from a work stoppage" rather than as
"a work stoppage which is the result of a labor dispute arising from
conditions of employment" that might be subject to Boys Markets
relief. Moreover, the court found that the contracts in question did
not contain express no-strike agreements "comparable to those con-
tained in the collective bargaining agreements . . . in which man-
datory orders were issued requiring the crossing of picket lines." 2
Therefore, the unions' obligation not to strike had to be implied
from their contractual grievance-arbitration clause which the court
found to be too narrow to imply a no-strike obligation in the circum-
stances presented.
The approach taken by these courts43 can be characterized as
reading Boys Markets to require two elements. First, there must be
a dispute which is subject to the grievance and arbitration proce-
dure of the collective bargaining agreement. Second, there must be
a work stoppage caused by the dispute. The conceptual problem in
applying this "causation" approach to the sympathy strike situa-
tion is that the two elements are coalesced; that is, the strike is the
dispute. Certainly, in a sympathy strike situation there is a dispute
between the company and the union as to the right of union mem-
bers to honor a picket line. A union will contend that a no-strike
clause in a contract does not waive the right of a union member to
honor a picket line on grounds of individual conscience, while a
company will argue that a typical no-strike clause waives any and
all right to honor a picket line. This dispute, however, normally
arises contemporaneously with the strike and therefore courts have
a problem in finding the strike to be "over a grievance."
39. 520 F.2d at 1222.
40. See note 30 and accompanying text supra.
41. 520 F.2d at 1227.
42. Id. at 1230.
43. See also General Cable Corp. v. IBEW Local 1644, 331 F. Supp. 478 (D. Md. 1971);
Ourisman Chevrolet Co. v. Automotive Lodge 1486, 77 L.R.R.M. 2084 (D.D.C. 1971); Stroeh-
mann Bros. Co. v. Confectionery Workers Local 427, 315 F. Supp. 647 (M.D. Pa. 1970);
Simplex Wire & Cable Co. v. Local 2208, IBEW, 314 F. Supp. 885 (D.N.H. 1970).
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B. Decisions Which Have Allowed Boys Markets Relief
Significant recent decisions indicate that the narrower view of
Boys Markets reflected in cases such as Amstar and Buffalo Forge
is indeed not shared by all federal courts." In Monongahela Power
Co. v. Local 2332, IMEW, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit was presented with a situation virtually identical to that
presented to the Fifth Circuit in Amstar. The employees at one of
Monongahela's locations went on strike and pickets from that local
went to another company location to publicize the strike. The em-
ployees working at that location were represented by a different
local of the same union, which had a collective bargaining agree-
ment with the company. This agreement, like the agreement in
44. For example, in Northwest Air Lines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 325 F. Supp. 994
(D. Minn.), rev'd, 442 F.2d 246 (8th Cir. 1970), on rehearing, 442 F.2d 251 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied 404 U.S. 871 (1971), an airline sought to enjoin its pilots from honoring a picket line
established by another union. The carrier contended that the refusal of its pilots to cross the
picket line constituted a violation of an implied no-strike clause and was therefore a "minor
dispute" which was to be resolved pursuant to the arbitration procedures set forth in the
Railway Labor Act. The district court denied injunctive relief and an order to arbitrate. 325
F. Supp. at 997. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed, ordering arbitration
and enjoining the work stoppage. 442 F.2d at 248. On rehearing, the court reiterated its earlier
position that the standard of arbitrability is the same under both the Railway Labor Act and
§ 301 of the LMRA, and again ordered the dispute to arbitration. Id. at 254.
The fact that this decision arose under the Railway Labor Act does not impair its applica-
bility to a § 301 action; the Supreme Court in Boys Markets had turned to its earlier decision
in Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago River & Indiana R.R. Co., 353 U.S. 30 (1957),
as direct support for its holding that the issuance of an injunction in cases such as this does
not offend the policies of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
As one observer, Gould, On Labor Injunctions, Unions, and the Judges: The Boys Markets
Case, 1970 Sup. CT. REv. 215, 238-39, has noted:
Thus, the Chicago River principle of accommodation governs § 301 as well. As noted
above, the distinction between the RLA and NLRA articulated by Sinclair has always
seemed strange. For, aside from the fact that resort to the NRAB is specifically pro-
vided by the statute, neither statutory procedure may be properly said to be more
compulsory or exclusive than the other. Under the RLA-as is the case under the
NLRA-one party must trigger machinery in order to have it utilized. Moreover, just
as the Court in Boys Market [sic] has indicated that an employer unwilling to proceed
to arbitration cannot obtain the fruits of the injunctive decree against a labor union,
so also under the RLA there is doubt that the Chicago River doctrine is applicable
where a submission has not been made to NRAB. Because Boys Market relied so
heavily upon Chicago River as well as "ordinary principles of equity" in the issuance
of injunctions, the attention of the courts confronted with requests for injunctive relief
under § 301 will undoubtedly focus upon experience to date under the Railway Labor
Act.
45. 484 F.2d 1209 (4th Cir. 1973). See also Armco Steel Corp. v. UMW, 505 F.2d 1129 (4th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3206 (U.S. Oct. 6, 1975) (No. 74-1574).
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Amstar, contained broad grievance, arbitration and no-strike
clauses.
In addressing the issue of whether injunctive relief was appropri-
ate, the Fourth Circuit first noted that in a Boys Markets case a
court must follow the presumption that all disputes are arbitrable
unless the parties have expressly excluded the matter. Finding no
exclusion, the court held that the "dispute as to whether the refusal
to cross the picket line and the resulting work stoppage violated
Article X [no-strike clause] was clearly subject to mandatory ad-
justments under Article IX."46 Thus, the court determined that the
prerequisites of Boys Markets were met.
Under a different type of concerted refusal to work, the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit also found injunctive relief to be ap-
propriate. In Avco Corp. v. Local 787, UA W, 7 the union took the
position that its members were not required to work overtime and,
accordingly, its members refused to work. The company sought in-
junctive relief, which was denied by the lower court.4" On appeal,
the Third Circuit reversed.49 Emphasizing the strong federal policy
in favor of arbitration ° and the questions which an arbitrator could
resolve in the case, the court concluded the dispute was arbitrable
46. 484 F.2d at 1214.
Further support for the Monongahela Power rationale is found in General Cable Corp. v.
IBEW Local 1798, 333 F. Supp. 331 (W.D. Tenn. 1971). In this case, the court was faced with
a comparable sympathy strike situation. The court held that since the dispute between the
parties over the question of whether a union's members could honor the picket line of another
union was arbitrable, injunctive relief was proper under Boys Markets. Moreover, the com-
pany informed the union prior to the work stoppage that it considered a refusal by its
employees to cross the picket line a breach of the no-strike clause. The court found that the
grievance between the company and the union arose prior to the work stoppage when the
pickets appeared, and, therefore, this case came within the narrow exception created by the
rule in the Boys Markets case. 333 F. Supp. at 334. See also NAPA Pittsburgh, Inc. v.
Automotive Chauffeurs Local 926, 363 F. Supp. 54 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
47. 459 F.2d 968 (3d Cir. 1972).
48. 325 F. Supp. 588 (M.D. Pa. 1971).
49. 459 F.2d at 974.
50. The court noted:
There are strong reasons supporting the federal policy in favor of arbitration. First,
arbitrators are more competent than courts to interpret labor contracts and to resolve
the problems of labor-management relations. Second, the process of arbitration con-
tributes to the maintenance of labor peace. Third, ordering arbitration is essential in
effectuating the parties' contractual intent to settle disputes through arbitration.
Fourth, a suit for damages rather than an injunction ordering arbitration "might not
repair the harm done by the strike, and might exacerabate labor-management strife."
Id. at 973 (citations omitted).
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and enjoined further refusals to perform overtime, pending arbitra-
tion."1
Avco is strong support for the awarding of an injunction when
generically the dispute is one over the parties' rights under the
collective bargaining agreement. In Avco, the employees refused to
work overtime on the ground that the contract gave them the right
to refuse such work, although nothing in the contract either specifi-
cally required or prohibited overtime. If the arbitrator held that the
employees had the right to refuse overtime, there would be no viola-
tion of the no-strike clause since the employees were doing what the
contract gave them the right to do-refuse overtime. If their inter-
pretation were wrong, however, a breach of the no-strike clause
plainly occurred. The arbitrator, reasoned the court, had the exper-
tise and authority necessary to peacefully resolve the dispute.
Even more persuasive support for this reading of Boys Markets is
found in the Supreme Court's decision in Gateway Coal Co. v.
UMW.52 In Gateway Coal, the bargaining agreement tontained a
provision which allowed the local mine safety committee to close
down an operation and remove workers from a dangerous area. The
union argued that this provision reserved the right to strike over
safety disputes and was thus an exception to the implied no-strike
obligation. Disagreeing with the Third Circuit, the Supreme Court
found that this safety committee provision had not been properly
invoked. The Court stated that whether the union properly invoked
this provision was a question of contractual interpretation, and that
the contract had explicitly committed to resolution by an impartial
umpire all disagreements "as to the meaning and application...
of this agreement. '5 3
Gateway Coal is significant in the sympathy strike situation for
two reasons. First, the Court found that a dispute over the scope of
an exception to the no-strike clause-the very type of dispute in-
volved in the sympathy strike situation-was arbitrable and, by
implication, enjoinable.5 4 Second, the Court indicated its unwilling-
51. Accord, Elevator Mfr.'s Ass'n v. Elevator Constructors Local 1, 342 F. Supp. 372
(S.D.N.Y. 1972).
52. 414 U.S. 368 (1974).
53. Id. at 384.
54. The result favoring arbitrability is hardly surprising when considering other aspects
of the Gateway ruling. In overturning a union argument that § 502 of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C.
§ 143 (1970), allowed employees with a "good faith belief' in a dangerous condition to strike,
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ness to allow a union to determine, in its own unreviewable discre-
tion, whether it has complied with contractual or statutory require-
ments. In a sympathy strike situation, refusal of injunctive relief
clearly allows the union to determine its compliance with the con-
tract.
When looking at Gateway Coal, Monongahela and Avco, it must
be understood that the test of arbitrability, as was held in United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.," is one of express
exclusion, not inclusion."6 Thus, absent express specific exclusion
from coverage of the arbitration clause, a dispute over the contrac-
tual legality of a refusal to cross a picket line is arbitrable under the
terms of the typical collective bargaining agreement. 7 Indeed, the
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, in a § 301 damage action
has held arbitrable a dispute over the scope of a union's no-strike
obligation arising out of its refusal to cross a stranger union's picket
line.58
Other circuits, in several post-Monongahela cases, have sup-
ported the traditional national labor policy reflected in that case,
namely a preference for resolution of disputes through arbitration,
and in doing so have awarded Boys Markets injunctions in sympa-
thy strike situations. For example, in NAPA Pittsburgh, Inc. v.
the Court stated that absent the most explicit statutory command, it was unwilling "to
conclude that Congress intended the public policy favoring arbitration and peaceful resolu-
tion of labor disputes to be circumvented by so slender a thread as subjective judgment,
however honest it may be." 414 U.S. at 386. Accord, Island Creek Coal Co. v. UMW, 507
F.2d 650 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3206 (U.S. Oct. 6, 1975) (No. 74-1573).
55. 363 U.S. 574, 581 (1960). Cf. Plain Dealer Publishing Co. v. Cleveland Typographical
Union No. 53, 520 F.2d 1220 (6th Cir. 1975), citing case law to the effect that the waiver of a
collective bargaining right must be in "clear and unmistakable language."
56. Similarly, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Monroe Sander Corp. v.
Livingston, 377 F.2d 6 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 831 (1967), stated the rule to be that
unless the parties expressly exclude a matter, the court will conclude that they intended to
submit it to arbitration. 377 F.2d at 9-10. Accord, Lodge 12, IAM v. Cameron Iron Works,
Inc., 292 F.2d 112 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 926 (1961).
57. Valmac Indus., Inc. v. Food Handlers Local 425, 519 F.2d 263 (8th Cir. 1975), petition
for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3280 (U.S. Oct. 31, 1975) (No. 75-647).
58. Johnson Builders, Inc. v. Carpenters Local 1095, 422 F.2d 137 (10th Cir. 1970). See
also Howard Electric Co. v. IBEW Local 570, 423 F.2d 164 (9th Cir. 1970); ITT World
Communications, Inc. v. Communications Workers of America, 422 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1970);
Pietro Scalzitti Co. v. Operating Eng'rs Local 150, 351 F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1965); Clothing
Workers of America v. United Garment Mfg. Co., 338 F.2d 195 (8th Cir. 1964); Swartz &
Funston, Inc. v. Bricklayers Local 7, 319 F.2d 116 (3d Cir. 1963); Yale & Towne Mfg. Co. v.
Local 1717, IAM, 299 F.2d 882 (3d Cir. 1962).
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Automotive Chauffeurs Local 926,11 the Teamsters had a recogni-
tional dispute with a company "substantially controlled" by NAPA
and picketed NAPA's plant. NAPA's employees were represented
by another union and the NAPA collective bargaining agreement
gave an employee the right to refuse to cross or work behind "pri-
mary picket lines." Further, the contract provided for arbitration of
"any and all grievances, complaints, or disputes arising between"
the parties. 0 NAPA employees refused to cross the Teamsters'
picket line and the president of the NAPA local indicated that the
employees were protected by the terms of their contract. NAPA
sought injunctive relief and an order directing arbitration. The dis-
trict court issued an injunction and a divided Third Circuit af-
firmed.6
In doing so, the Third Circuit emphasized the frequently articu-
lated federal policy favoring arbitration and delineated its view as
to the standard of enjoinability under Boys Markets.2 The court
concluded that there was certainly an arbitrable "dispute" which
was covered by the contractual requirement of arbitration. 3 The
issue of whether the picket line was primary or secondary was arbi-
trable under the contract, and the local had properly been enjoined
from picketing pending arbitration of that issue.
Like the Fourth Circuit in Monongahela, the Third Circuit's
NAPA decision rejects the two-step process of the Amstar rationale.
The court in NAPA correctly focused its inquiry on whether or not
the dispute over the right to honor the picket line was arbitrable.
Once answering this inquiry in the affirmative, the court properly
59. 502 F.2d 321 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1049 (1974).
60. 502 F.2d at 323.
61. Id.
62. The court stated:
In cases of this nature we start with the basic premise that the law favors arbitration
of labor disputes. That there can be no doubt about this is clear from the pronounce-
ments of the Supreme Court in the Steelworkers' Trilogy. . . . The most recent reaffir-
mation of the policy may be found in Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of
America . ...
Boys Markets . . . holds in essence that where a matter has been made arbitrable
by the terms of a contract between the union and the company, an injunction may be
issued to enforce this method of settling controversies between the parties. In deter-
mining whether a matter is arbitrable under the contract, any doubt should be resolved





granted injunctive relief. This approach is compatible with the pol-
icy favoring the substitution of arbitration for industrial warfare
and, moreover, gives effect to the parties' underlying intent to sub-
mit all of their disputes to arbitration.
Perhaps the best analysis of the competing interests present in
sympathy strike situations-the employer's desire to terminate the
work stoppage versus the employee's right to refuse to cross a lawful
picket line-is that of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
in Valmac Industries, Inc. v. Food Handlers Local 425.64 In that
case, the employer had separate contracts with the same local at its
four plants. When the employees struck at two of the plants, they
also picketed at the other two locations. The district court granted
injunctive relief, but did not specifically provide in its order that the
dispute be submitted to arbitration.
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit examined both the Amstar-Buffalo
Forge line of cases denying injunctive relief and the Monongahela
line of cases which relied heavily on the policy favoring dispute
resolution through the arbitration process. Turning to the Supreme
Court's Gateway Coal decision, the court reiterated the "presump-
tion of arbitrability" set forth therein 5 and applied that presump-
tion, finding that the work stoppage precipitated by the employees
honoring the picket line constituted an arbitrable dispute over inter-
pretation of the contract.6 It then properly enjoined the union sub-
64. 519 F.2d 263 (8th Cir. 1975), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3280 (U.S. Oct. 31,
1975) (No. 75-647); accord, Associated Gen. Contractors v. Construction & Gen. Laborers
Local 563, 519 F.2d 269 (8th Cir. 1975).
65. The court stated:
The Supreme Court found a no-strike obligation to be implied by the arbitration
provision and held that the safety dispute in issue presented a substantial question of
contract construction. Concluding that such premises were sufficient to support the
issuance of an injunction barring a work stoppage which had arisen over the safety
dispute, the Court rejected any approach which would have allowed the union to make
its own subjective evaluation of safety conditions in order to invoke a statutory excep-
tion to an implied no strike agreement, saying:
* * * Absent the most explicit statutory command, we are unwilling to conclude
that Congress intended the public policy favoring arbitration and peaceful reso-
lution of labor disputes to be circumvented by so slender a thread as subjective
judgment, however honest it may be.
519 F.2d at 267 (citations omitted).
66. Focusing on the agreement provisions before it, the court noted that the binding
arbitration provisions applied to any grievance "involving an interpretation, application or
violation of [the] Agreement":
There can be little doubt that had the company protested the picket line before the
work stoppage occurred the resulting dispute would have been subject to binding
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ject to prompt arbitration of the claim. Valmac stands as an exam-
ple of a case-involving a situation where the collective bargaining
agreement contained a provision for binding arbitration of disputes,
a no-strike clause, and a provision protecting the employees' right
to refuse to cross a picket line-which fully accomodates the na-
tional labor policies of promoting industrial peace through arbitra-
tion and preventing abusive use of injunctions against legal con-
certed activity.
Without even the specific command to prompt arbitration, the
same considerations recognized in Valmac have induced other fed-
eral courts to enjoin sympathy strikes pending arbitration. In Pilot
Freight Carriers, Inc. v. Teamsters Local 728,17 the parties' contract
provided that an employee who refused to cross or work behind a
"primary" picket line would not be disciplined. The contract obli-
gated two unions to refrain from calling, aiding or assisting in any
unauthorized work stoppage or "cessation of work" and contained
a broad and mandatory grievance-arbitration clause covering all
disputes between the parties. The employees represented by those
two unions honored the picket line of a third union which had been
refused recognition at another location of the company. In granting
an injunction, the court distinguished Amstar on the grounds that
the grievance and arbitration clause here was broader and went on
to follow the reasoning in Monongahela Power.
Another recent case exemplifying the trend of courts to find that
sympathy strike disputes are encompassed by the contract arbitra-
tion clause is the Seventh Circuit's decision in Inland Steel Co. v.
Local 1545, UMW. 5 In that case, two companies sought Boys
Markets relief against employees who were honoring another union's
picket line. The companies obtained their relief in district court, but
the sympathy strike persisted. Contempt orders were entered
arbitration. It makes little sense to argue that because the work stoppage precipitated
the dispute it was not a work stoppage "over" a grievance which the parties were
contractually bound to arbitrate. We think the holdings in NAPA and Monongahela
and their progeny are consistent with a congressional purpose to encourage settlement
of disputes by arbitration, including situations in which purported exceptions to a no-
strike clause under the collective bargaining agreement are in dispute. Injunctive
relief, conditioned upon prompt arbitration of the dispute, does not nullify the union's
right to establish or honor a picket line; it "only suspends the exercise of the right until
its existence is established by an arbitrator's decision."
Id. at 267-68 (footnote and citations omitted).
67. 86 L.R.R.M. 2419 (N.D. Ga. 1974).
68. 505 F.2d 293 (7th Cir. 1974).
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against union officials. Both the injunctions and the contempt or-
ders were appealed.
The Seventh Circuit noted that all parties before it were signato-
ries of the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1968. That
contract did not have a no-strike clause but did contain a manda-
tory grievance procedure which covered disputes "not specifically
mentioned in this agreement" and "any local trouble of any kind
arising at the mine." Characterizing the issue as whether the unions
had the right under the agreement to refuse to cross picket lines
established by another union, the court considered the intent of the
parties and the public policy favoring arbitration." Given these pol-
icy considerations as announced in Steelworkers Trilogy and under-
scored in Gateway Coal, the court held that the dispute fell within
the arbitration clause of the collective bargaining agreement in ex-
istence between the parties." Having concluded that the unions
were under a duty to arbitrate the issue of whether or not they could
honor the stranger picket line, the court affirmed the district court's
issuance of injunctive relief.
The decisions in Monongahela, NAPA, Valmac, Pilot Freight
Carriers and Inland recognize the national labor policy of
channeling disputes through agreed upon procedures and are in
sharp contrast to the approaches in Amstar and Buffalo Forge.
Moreover, they-especially Valmac-in no way remotely approach
the abuses of 45 years ago which led Congress to pass the Norris-
LaGuardia Act; rather, they reflect accommodation of the policy
favoring arbitration with Norris-LaGuardia's nonintervention pol-
icy.
On the other hand, the Amstar and Buffalo Forge cases are partic-
ularly disconcerting in light of the fact that neither the Fifth Circuit
nor the Second Circuit even mentioned the decade of case law devel-
opment under the Steelworkers Trilogy establishing the presump-
tion in favor of arbitrability, did not acknowledge the rulings deal-
69. The court stated:
We further believe that this conclusion is enhanced by the strong public policy in
favor of arbitration which was persuasively enunciated in the Steelworkers Trilogy.
The often discussed presumption of arbitrability for labor disputes was recently reaf-
firmed by the Supreme Court in Gateway Coal Co. v. Mine Workers. . . . While the
arbitrability of the disputes involved here may not be free from doubt, the Trilogy has
instructed that all such doubts be resolved in favor of arbitration.
Id. at 298 (footnote and citations omitted).
70. Id. at 299.
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ing with analogous factual and policy considerations under the Rail-
way Labor Act 7' (which reached a conclusion directly contrary to the
rulings in those cases), and did not deal with the opposing authority
from the NLRB and labor arbitrators on the issue of arbitrability.
Amstar and Buffalo Forge-in requiring that first there be a dis-
pute "over" a grievance subject to the grievance and arbitration
procedures of the agreement and, second, that there be a work stop-
page-deny injunctive relief in a situation where arbitration can
resolve the dispute. Certainly if one takes the goal of industrial
peace set forth in Boys Markets together with the presumption of
arbitrability set forth in the Steelworkers Trilogy, it would seem
that the relevant and critical inquiry in a § 301 injunction suit is
whether the arbitration can resolve the strike. The shadowy argu-
ment of the Amstar-Buffalo Forge lineage that no dispute exists
between the parties flies in the face of reality. In a sympathy strike
situation clearly there exist disputed issues as to whether or not
union members have a right to refuse to cross a picket line and, if
so, whether that right has been waived in the collective bargaining
agreement.
The argument that the disagreement over the scope of the no-
strike obligation is not subject to an agreement's mandatory
grievance-arbitration procedure is equally invalid and is in direct
conflict with the presumption of arbitrability mandated by
Steelworkers Trilogy and reaffirmed by Gateway Coal.72 A union's
contractual commitment to the grievance-arbitration procedure
would be hollow, at best, if it or its members could simply ascertain
their own rights under the agreement rather than seek an arbitra-
tor's determination. 3 Similarly, courts have repeatedly indicated
71. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago River & Indiana RR. Co., 353 U.S. 30
(1957); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 325 F. Supp. 994 (D. Minn. 1970).
72. In United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960), the
Supreme Court ruled that a court cannot declare an issue non-arbitrable "unless it may be
said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation
that covers the asserted dispute. Doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage." Id. at 582-
83 (emphasis added).
73. For example, the Court in Avco said:
The "no-strike" clause is the quid pro quo which Avco obtained for agreeing to submit
to compulsory arbitration, and the Union agreed to forbear from striking in order to
require such arbitration. To allow the Union to abandon its remedy of arbitration in
order to disregard the 'no-strike' clause would render the collective bargaining agree-
ment illusory and would subvert the policy favoring the peaceful settlement of labor
disputes by arbitration.
459 F.2d at 972.
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that grievance and arbitration provisions are to be viewed expan-
sively."
In the sympathy strike situation, an arbitrator can resolve the
dispute by determining whether or not the union's members have a
right under the collective bargaining agreement to honor a picket
line. This area is not new to arbitrators" and the National Labor
Relations Board has so recognized by deferring a case to arbitration
where the issue was whether or not employees had a right to honor
a picket line.76 As such, this type of dispute, in the Supreme Court's
words, "is grist in the mills of the arbitrators.""
74. For example, in Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Communications Workers of America,
454 F.2d 1333 (5th Cir. 1971), the district court had denied injunctive relief under Boys
Markets on the basis that the dispute in question was not one which the parties were bound
to arbitrate; in vacating this denial of injunctive relief, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit held that in determining whether a dispute is arbitrable, a court is "confined to
ascertaining whether the party seeking arbitration is making a-claim which on its face is
governed by the contract and which is 'arguably arbitrable.' "Id. at 1336. See also Lodge 15,
Machinists v. Cameron Iron Works, 77 L.R.R.M. 2778 (S.D. Tex. 1970), aff'd per curiam, 444
F.2d 112 (5th Cir. 1971).
75. See, e.g., Drake Bakeries, Inc. v. Bakery Workers Local 50, 370 U.S. 254 (1962);
Howard Electric Co. v. IBEW Local 570, 423 F.2d 164 (9th Cir. 1970); ITT World Communi-
cations, Inc. v. Communications Workers of America, 422 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1970); H.K. Porter
Co. v. Local 37, USW, 400 F.2d 691 (4th Cir. 1968). See also Shop Rite Foods, Inc., 58 Lab.
Arb. 965 (1972) (Ray, Arbitrator); Amalgamated Lace Operative, 54 Lab. Arb. 140 (1969)
(Frey, Arbitrator); General American Transp. Corp., 41 Lab. Arb. 214 (1963) (Abrahams,
Arbitrator); Regent Quality Furniture, Inc., 32 Lab. Arb. 553 (1959) (Turkus, Arbitrator);
New England Master Textile Engravers Guild, 9 Lab. Arb. 199 (1947) (Wallen, Arbitrator).
76. Gary-Hobart Water Corp., 200 N.L.R.B. 647 (1972), aff'd, 511 F.2d 284 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3263 (U.S. Nov. 4, 1975) (No. 75-68). Prior to Gary-Hobart, the NLRB
position with respect to the legality of refusals to cross picket lines was unclear. See Carney
& Florsheim, The Treatment of Refusals to Cross Picket Lines: "By-Paths and Indirect
Crookt Ways," 55 CORNELL L. REv. 940 (1970); Note, Respect for Picket Lines, 42 IND. L. REv.
536 (1967); Note, Picket Line Observance: The Board and The Balance of Interests, 79 YALE
L.J. 1369 (1970)" Compare Redwing Carriers, Inc., 137 N.L.R.B. 1545 (1962), enforced sub
nom., Teamsters Local 79 v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S.
905 (1964), with Redwing Carriers, Inc., 130 N.L.R.B. 1208 (1961).
77. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 584 (1960).
Various commentators have also recognized that the question of whether the no-strike
clause was breached is best left to an arbitrator's judgment. For example, Professor Edgar
Jones, in Power and Prudence in the Arbitration of Labor Disputes: A Venture in Some
Hypotheses, 11 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 675 (1964), has written:
State judges (and, for that matter, federal judges whose removal or remanding powers
are exercised so as to preserve jurisdiction in state judges to enjoin) should be required
to refer no-strike contractual disputes immediately to arbitration. These matters are
of paramount sensitivity in collective bargaining, and the judge who is not technically
competent to displace the arbitrator's judgment in other less sensitive areas of collec-
tive bargaining certainly ought not to be deemed to be so here.
Id. at 780 (footnote omitted).
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To the Supreme Court then, it is the expeditious settlement of
industrial disputes through arbitration-without economic war-
fare-that is at the core of Boys Markets. Thus, it must be asked
in each Boys Markets type of case whether arbitration of the dis-
pute, in accordance with the parties' contract, would have obviated
resort to violation of the no-strike clause or, to look at it another
way, whether an arbitrator's award could have fully settled the
contractual dispute. Obviously, where the parties themsblves have
specifically rejected arbitration as the means to settle such a dis-
pute" or where the dispute is plainly not arbitrable under the con-
tract,79 no injunction would be appropriate.
The sympathy strike situation is simply another dispute which
under the terms of most collective bargaining agreements can be
resolved in its entirety through arbitration. If a union and its mem-
bers have a right to honor a picket line, a company would be fore-
closed from seeking injunctive relief. If an arbitrator finds that a
union did not reserve to itself the right to honor a picket line, a
company can secure enforcement of that award. 0 Most signifi-
cantly, injunctive relief in the sympathy strike situation gives rise
to none of the abuses Norris-LaGuardia was intended to prevent.
Rather, the opposite is true, for requiring a union to channel a
dispute through the grievance-arbitration procedure, rather than
resorting to self-help, is entirely consistent not only with a union's
contractual commitments, but with Norris-LaGuardia as well.8
78. Martin Hageland, Inc. v. United States Dist. Court, 460 F.2d 789 (9th Cir. 1972);
Associated Gen. Contractors v. Teamsters Union, 454 F.2d 1324 (7th Cir. 1972).
79. Emery Air Freight Corp..v. Local 295, Teamsters, 449 F.2d 586 (2d Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 1066 (1972).
80. See, e.g., New Orleans Steamship Ass'n v. Longshore Workers Local 1418, 389 F.2d
369 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 828 (1968); Pacific Maritime Ass'n v. International
Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union, 304 F. Supp. 1315 (N.D. Cal. 1969), aff'd, 454
F.2d 262 (9th Cir. 1971). The decision of the court in New Orleans Steamship is further
support for the issuance of an injunction in a sympathy strike situation. There the court
recognized that an arbitrator's award ordering a union not to engage in a work stoppage could
be enforced despite the rule of Sinclair. Yet, ignoring its plea to pursue arbitration rather than
striking a union would prevent a company from ever enforcing this very commitment.
81. As the Court emphasized in Boys Markets:
We rejected [in Lincoln Mills] the contention that the anti-injunction proscriptions
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act prohibited this type of relief [an order to arbitrate],
noting that a refusal to arbitrate was not "part and parcel of the abuses against which
the Act was aimed," ... and that the Act itself manifests a policy determination that
arbitration should be encouraged.




The conflict between the policies relied upon in the Amstar-
Buffalo Forge line of cases with those relied upon in the
Monongahela line of cases may at first appear irreconcilable. How-
ever, the Eighth Circuit's Valmac decision may well provide the key
to resolving the conflict. While Buffalo Forge relies heavily upon the
"narrow exception" doctrine of Boys Markets to the exclusion of the
national policy favoring resort to arbitration, and Monongahela re-
lies on the same policies but in reverse order of importance, Valmac
accommodates both with over-emphasis on neither.
Boys Markets left vague what constitutes a dispute over a griev-
ance subject to the contractual grievance and arbitration provisions.
Indeed, the Court could have said little more in view of the plethora
of contract provisions defining grievances subject to a particular
grievance-arbitration procedure. All that it could do was establish
the principle that, in such circumstances, a narrow exception to
Norris-LaGuardia's nonintervention mandate exists. 2 Monon-
gahela and its progeny apply this principle by first examining
the contractual provisions of the parties in order to determine if
arguably the dispute is subject to arbitral resolution. The conclusion
reached in a particular case is based solely upon interpretation of
the contractual provisions voluntarily agreed to by the parties. The
focus of attention is thus directed toward the intent of the parties
as established in their agreement, giving due regard to the policy of
resolution of disputes through the machinery voluntarily estab-
lished by the parties for that purpose. Valmac, moreover, considers
the concern of the Amstar cases and does no violence to the "narrow
exception" principle established by the Boys Markets Court. Under
the Valmac rationale emphasizing the Boys Markets requirement
that injunctive relief be conditioned on an order to arbitrate, the
judiciary is not expanding the range of situations in which the Boys
Markets exception to Norris-LaGuardia applies. Rather, the courts
the growth and viability of labor organizations is hardly retarded-if anything, this
goal is advanced-by a remedial device that merely enforces the obligation that the
union freely undertook under a specifically enforceable agreement to submit disputes
to arbitration.
398 U.S. at 242, 252-53 (footnotes and citations omitted).
82. In keeping with the holding of Boys Markets, that an order to arbitrate issue with the




are giving due regard to the traditional labor policy first established
by the Steelworkers Trilogy disputes. Boys Markets continues to be
applicable only where there is a dispute over a grievance subject to
contractual grievance arbitration. The only difference now is that
the parameters of the term "grievance" have been defined more
clearly, i.e., whatever matters the parties, by their collective bar-
gaining agreement, have agreed to submit to, or have failed to
clearly exclude from, the contractual dispute resolution mechanism.
IV. LAWSUITS FOR DAMAGES FOR A UNION'S PARTICIPATION IN A
SYMPATHY STRIKE
No matter how the Supreme Court rules in Buffalo Forge on the
issue of the availability of injunctive relief, an employer still has the
statutory right to money damages for injury inflicted by an illegal
sympathy strike. Sections 301 and 303 of the Labor-Management
Relations Act allow an employer to recover money damages result-
ing from illegal strikes. These provisions are clearly applicable to
the sympathy strike situation, once the illegality of a strike is
shown. This section of the article discusses a variety of cases in
which unions, to avoid liability under § 301, have attempted to
establish the legality of their sympathy strike.
A. The Basis of Illegality
In a relatively old case, NLRB v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co.,83 it
was held that refusal to cross a lawful picket line,84 established at
the employees' regular work location by a union representing a dif-
ferent bargaining unit, was not protected by § 7 of the LMRA5 as
83. 189 F.2d 124 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 885 (1951).
84. In the whole area of permissible employer treatment of refusals to cross picket lines
the commentators have been unable to discern a coherent pattern. See Carney & Florsheim,
The Treatment of Refusals to Cross Picket Lines: "By-Paths and Indirect Crookt Ways, " 55
CORNELL L. REv. 940 (1970); Getman, The Protection of Economic Pressure By Section 7 o1
the National Labor Relations Act, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 1195 (1967); O'Connor, Respecting
Picket Lines: A Union View, 7 N.Y.U. CONF. ON LABOR 235 (1954); Schatzki, Some Observa-
tions and Suggestions Concerning a Misnomer-"Protected" Concerted Activities, 47 TEX.
L. REv. 378 (1969); Note, Respect for Picket Lines, 42 IND. L.J. 536 (1967); Note, Picket Line
Observance: The Board and the Balance of Interests, 79 YALE L.J. 1369 (1970).
85. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970) provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing,
and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all
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such conduct was not for the "mutual aid or protection" of the
refusing employees themselves," as defined in § 7. Hence, reasoned
the court, the employer's demotion of employees who refused to
cross the picket line was permissible and, contrary to the Board's
conclusion, the actions of the employer did not violate §§ 8(a)(1)
and 8(a)(3) of the NLRA.Y7 Similarly, the Eighth Circuit in NLRB
v. L. G. Everist, Inc.,8 specifically rejected.the Board's position that
employees who refused to cross a picket line at a job site were
protected to the same extent as primary economic strikers. The
court held such a refusal to be simply a refusal to work which sub-
jected the employees to permanent discharge for cause. The court
denied enforcement of that part of the Board's order which required
the reinstatement of four employees who had been discharged for
refusal to cross such a picket line.
Although the Illinois Bell Telephone and Everist decisions have
not been expressly overruled, the Board has not acquiesced in their
narrow interpretation of § 7 protection. More importantly, other
appellate courts have recently adopted an expansive reading of § 7.19
In NLRB v. Union Carbide Corp.,10 the Fourth Circuit, after citing
Illinois Bell Telephone and Everist, concluded:
But it now seems to be fairly well established by the most
recent authority that nonstriking employees who refuse as a
matter of principle to cross a picket line maintained by their
fellow employees have 'plighted [their] troth with the strikers,
joined in their common cause, and [have] thus become . . .
striker[s] [themselves].' . . . It cannot be denied that re-
spect for the integrity of the picket line may well be the source
of strength of the whole collective bargaining process in which
every union member has a legitimate and protected economic
interest. And any assistance by a union member to a labor
organization in the collective bargaining process is for mutual
of such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement
requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as
authorized in section 158(a)(3) of this title.
86. 189 F.2d at 127-28.
87. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1), (3) (1970).
88. 334 F.2d 312 (8th Cir. 1964).
89. See Virginia Stage Lines, Inc. v. NLRB, 441 F.2d 499 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
856 (1971); NLRB v. Union Carbide Corp., 440 F.2d 54 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 826
(1971); NLRB v. Southern Greyhound Lines, 426 F.2d 1299 (5th Cir. 1970).
90. 440 F.2d 54 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 826 (1971).
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aid or protection of the nonstriking unionist even though he has
no immediate stake in the labor dispute.'
To this broad interpretation of the § 7 right of employees, the
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in NLRB v. Difco
Laboratories, Inc."2 added yet another element by emphasizing that
the § 7 right of an employee to refuse to cross a picket line was an
individual right which did not depend on the wishes of the picketing
union. Thus, in Difco, two employees, members of one union, were
discharged for their refusal to cross a second union's picket line at
their employer's plant. In enforcing the Board's order that the dis-
charges violated § 7, the court adopted a broad reading of "con-
certed activity" for "mutual aid or protection" and stated that
whether the second union did or did not want the two discharged
employees to strike obviously had no bearing on their right to do so
if they considered such action to be in their own best interest . 3
The broad interpretation of § 7's protection to those employees
who refuse to cross a picket line exemplified by the Union Carbide94
decision has been expressly adopted by the First Circuit in General
Tire & Rubber Co. v. NLRB,95 and reiterated by the Sixth Circuit
in Kellogg Co. v. NLRB.5 6 In Kellogg, the court held that the right
of employees who were members of the Millers Union to refuse to
cross a picket line established by the Pressmen at their employer's
plant depended upon the terms of the Millers' contract with Kel-
91. 440 F.2d at 55-56. It is noteworthy that the court went on to hold that such a refusal
was activity protected by § 7 only when based on principle. The court enforced the Board's
order of reinstatement with back pay for two employees whose refusal was found to be based
on principle, but denied enforcement of a similar order as to a third employee whose refusal
it found to be based "on fear and nothing else." Id. at 56. Thus the motivation of an employee
in refusing to cross a picket line, which is a question of fact, is relevant in determining whether
his conduct is protected by § 7 and, therefore, in deciding whether he can legally be subjected
to discipline or discharge.
92. 427 F.2d 170 (6th Cir. 1970).
93. Id. at 172. Subsequently, in Kellogg Co. v. NLRB, 457 F.2d 519 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 850 (1972), the Sixth Circuit apparently extended this principle still further
by ruling that the determination by officials of the employee's own union as to crossing a
picket line is not determinative of the employee's rights. In Kellogg, the case was ultimately
governed by the terms of a collective bargaining agreement rather than by § 7 alone, but the
comment by the court is still significant as an indication of the basic § 7 rights of the
individual employee.
94. See also Virginia Stage Lines, Inc. v. NLRB, 441 F.2d 499 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 856 (1971).
95. 451 F.2d 257 (lst Cir. 1971).
96. 457 F.2d 519 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 850 (1972).
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logg.1 To underscore its ruling that, considering § 7 alone, refusal
to cross a picket line is protected activity, the court in Kellogg
emphasized that the right to strike was protected by law, whether
it was for economic reasons, for the purpose of improving working
conditions, or for mutual aid or protection of employees who were
members of another union. 8
In light of the clear trend of recent appellate decisions, it appears
unwise to rely on the older authority of the Illinois Bell Telephone
and Everist cases which adopted a narrow interpretation of § 7
rights in the contest of a refusal to cross a picket line. Furthermore,
while the United States Supreme Court has not ruled directly on
this aspect of § 7, it implied in NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply
Co.99 that refusal to cross a picket line is protected activity unless
this right has been waived in negotiations.
In Rockaway News, the Supreme Court was faced with the ques-
tion of whether an employer could discharge an employee for failing
to cross a picket line. The collective bargaining agreement covering
the employees included a no-strike clause.' 0 In interpreting the
scope of that clause, the Court considered the fact that during nego-
tiations the union had proposed a picket line clause (which proposal
was rejected by the employer) and that the union had acquiesced
in the rejection and consented to the no-strike clause. In light of this
bargaining history, the Court found that the no-strike clause prohib-
ited an employee's refusal to cross a picket line and, thus, the em-
ployer lawfully discharged the employee.' 0 '
The decision in Rockaway News was followed by the Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. v.
NLRB. 0 In that case, the union agreed to refrain'from striking "on
97. The court stated:
[W]e conclude that if the Millers' contract did not prohibit the sympathetic honoring
of another Union's picket line then Putnam and Sutfin were engaging in protected
concerted activity (as will be pointed out hereafter), and if the contract did prohibit
such activity then they were properly discharged.
457 F.2d at 522.
98. Id. at 523.
99. 345 U.S. 71 (1953).
100. That clause read:
No strikes, lockouts or other cessation of work or interference therewith shall be or-
dered or sanctioned by any party hereto during the term hereof except as against a
party failing to comply with a decision, award, or order of the Adjustment Board.
Id. at 79.
101. Id. at 79-80.
102. 455 F.2d 1088 (8th Cir. 1972).
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account of any controversy respecting the provisions of this Agree-
ment," but argued that the no-strike clause'0 3 allowed its members
to honor a peaceful informational picket line. The court pointed out
that in negotiations the employer had indicated that it would not
insist on a right to discharge employees who refused to cross a picket
line, but that it did demand the right to discipline such employees.
The union had agreed to this. On the basis of this history, the court
held that the union bargained away its right to refuse to cross a
picket line." 4
Although these cases show that the pertinent collective bargain-
ing history normally must be closely scrutinized to determine
whether the parties have openly discussed the issue of refusal to
cross picket lines, in Gary Hobart Water Corp. v. NLRB 05 the Sev-
enth Circuit refused to consider the bargaining history of the parties
when the clause before it was clear on its face. Relying upon its
earlier decision in Inland Steel Co. v. Local 1545, UMW10° in which
it had interpreted the identical clause applying to "differences...
as to the meaning and interpretation of [the] agreement," the
court ruled that the provision did not affect the right to engage in a
sympathy strike, since there was clear and unmistakable language
waiving that right. Under these circumstances, the court concluded
that the bargaining history between the company and the union
need not be examined in order to interpret the language of the
collective bargaining agreement. 07
Consistent with Gary Hobart is the decision in Kellogg Co. v.
NLRB, 0 1 where the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit examined
the specific terms of the applicable contract to determine whether
103. That clause provided:
It is recognized that the Company is engaged in public service requiring continuous
operation, and it is agreed, in recognition of such obligation of continuous service that,
during the term of this Agreement there shall be no collective cessation of work by
members of the Union and that the Company will not lock out the employees covered
by this Agreement on account of any controversy respecting the provisions of this
Agreement. All such controversies shall be handled as provided for herein.
Id. at 1090.
104. Id. at 1093. See also News Union v. NLRB, 393 F.2d 673 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Firestone
Tire & Rubber Co. v. United Rubber Workers, 82 L.R.R.M. 2830 (M.D. Ga. 1972), af'd, 476
F.2d 603 (5th Cir. 1973); Kelley-Nelson Constr. Co. v. Laborers' Local 107, 80 L.R.R.M. 2334
(W.D. Ark. 1972).
105. 511 F.2d 284 (7th Cir. 1975).
106. 505 F.2d 293 (7th Cir. 1974).
107. 511 F.2d at 288.
108. 457 F.2d 519 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 850 (1972).
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there had been a waiver of the employees' rights not to cross a picket
line. Although the terms appeared broad enough to constitute a
prohibition of picket line observance, the court in Kellogg adopted
a strong position that the relinquishment of the right to refuse to
cross a picket line must be evidenced by "clear and unmistakable
language."'' 9 It observed that it was neither necessary nor appropri-
ate to consider extrinsic evidence to interpret the contract, even
though there was such evidence available showing that the involved
union officials regarded the no-strike clause as prohibiting picket
line observance. On this basis, the court concluded that it found
nothing in the language of the contract which prohibited a member
of the union from honoring the picket line of another union at the
same plant."' This treatment of the case appears to be at least
somewhat inconsistent with Rockaway, but since the Supreme
Court has refused to review Kellogg, it must be respected as an
authoritative opinion of at least one circuit.
There is also authority for the proposition that in the absence of
a specific clause preserving the right to engage in sympathy strikes,
a broad no-strike clause precludes a sympathy strike. The United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has so stated
in News Union v. NLRB."'
In summation, then, despite the difficulties an employer faces
in showing that there has been a contractual waiver of the § 7 right
to honor a stranger's picket line, once that waiver is established he
may sue for damages for breach of contract under § 301. Only the
employer's burden on "waiver" differs among the circuits.
109. The relevant no-strike provisions of the agreement provided:
NO STRIKES-NO LOCKOUTS
Section 1101
(a) During the life of this Supplemental Agreement no strike or work stoppages
in connection with disputes arising hereunder shall be caused or sanctioned by
the Union, or by any member thereof, and no lockout shall be ordered by the
Company in connection with such disputes.
NO SYMPATHY STRIKE
Section 1102
During the life of this Supplemental Agreement, no sympathy strike shall be
caused or sanctioned by the Union because of differences between the AFL-CIO
or any of its affiliated Unions and any other local or national employers, except
for differences between the AFL-CIO or any of its affiliated Unions involving
other plants of the Company.
Id. at 520-21.
110. Id. at 525-26.
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B. Lawsuits for Damages v. Arbitration
It should be noted that an employer's right to sue for damages,
unlike his ability to secure injunctive relief, is not conditioned on
his agreement to arbitrate. Two wrongs exist in every sympathy
strike situation: the refusal to arbitrate the issue of whether or not
employees have a right to refuse to cross a picket line under the
collective bargaining agreement, and the strike itself in violation of
the no-strike clause. Each affords the employer separate remedies
which are not mutually exclusive. The latter wrong is not subject
to the arbitration procedure but is the proper subject of a lawsuit
for damages.
Where unions exchange a broad no-strike clause, waiving their
right to strike, for a broad grievance and arbitration procedure de-
signed to dispose of employee problems and resolve disputes, the
unions become liable in damages for their actions and the actions
of their members in breaching the no-strike clause. Under the broad
language of United Steelworkers v. American Manufacturing Co.112
111. 393 F.2d 673 (D.C. Cir. 1968). The court stated:
[The unions] point out that there is no explicit reference to the crossing of picket lines
[in the no-strike clause] and suggest initially that language which in terms inhibits
only a strike is not to be read as restricting the observance of picket lines. But the
practical relationship between work stoppages and the honoring of picket lines is so
well understood in the industrial climate that we think that a clause of this kind using
only the word "strike" includes plant suspensions resulting from refusals to report for
work across picket lines.
Id. at 676-77. See also Alliance Mfg. Co., 200 N.L.R.B. 697 (1972). Cf. Kellogg Co. v. NLRB,
457 F.2d 519 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 850 (1972).
In both the News Union and Montana-Dakota cases, the collective bargaining agreement
had a broad no-strike clause which referred only to "strikes" and had no specific clause
relating to sympathy strikes. Both cases held that such strikes and refusals to cross picket
lines were within the scope of the no-strike prohibition even though they were not specifically
mentioned in the contract. In Kellogg, the collective bargaining agreement had not only a
no-strike clause but also contained a specific clause dealing with sympathy strikes. The court
in Kellogg noted that if the collective bargaining agreement had only contained the no-strike
clause a sympathy strike might well have been barred. Since, however, the agreement did
contain a specific clause dealing with sympathy strikes and since that specific clause was
more narrowly drawn than was the no-strike clause, the court concluded that a sympathy
strike by a union member was permissible. 457 F.2d at 526.
The News Union case is contrary to the union-advocated theory of "inclusion" where,
despite a broad no-strike clause, the right to cross a picket line would be preserved unless
specifically prohibited. That theory, however, renders the normal no-strike clause meaning-
less, as it would require an impossible chore of the bargainers, namely, advance enumeration
of every potential reason for a strike. In contrast to News Union, the inclusion theory appears
to have been adopted by the NLRB and affirmed by the Seventh Circuit in its recent decision
in Gary Hobart.
112. 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
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and United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.," 3 an
employer is entitled to insist that the quid pro quo"4 be fulfilled and
can sue for damages if this obligation is dishonored. A strike to settle
a dispute which could go through the grievance and arbitration
procedure violates the contract, and a strike which violates the con-
tract entitles the employer to damages under § 301 of the LMRA."5
A company's primary argument in these situations is that arbitra-
tion provisions which are entirely employee oriented and only per-
mit the submission of grievances by employees and not by the com-
pany clearly preclude arbitration of a violation of a no-strike clause.
Courts have recognized that arbitration is a matter of contract and
that, absent an agreement to arbitrate, a reluctant party normally
cannot be compelled to do so."' The real question here, though, is
whether the company may be compelled to arbitrate the issue of the
union's alleged breach of the no-strike clause even though under the
applicable arbitration provisions the company itself has no access
to arbitration. The decided cases have uniformly answered this
question in the negative.
In Boeing Co. v. UAW,"7 the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit was presented with this very question in a sympathy strike
situation. The employer alleged that a union had violated a no-
strike clause in a collective bargaining agreement; the union denied
that it had engaged in such a violation. The employer then brought
suit against the union under § 301 of the LMRA and the union
moved to stay the proceeding pending arbitration even though the
arbitration provisions were entirely employee oriented. On these
facts, the Third Circuit flatly held that the employer could not be
compelled to arbitrate the alleged breach of the no-strike clause and
affirmed a lower court's refusal to stay the proceedings."'
On identical facts, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, in
G. T. Schjeldahl Co. v. Local 1680, IAM,"19 reached an identical
113. 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
114. See lodice v. Calabrese, 345 F. Supp. 248 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
115. Peggs Run Coal Co. v. District 5, UMW, 338 F. Supp. 1275 (W.D. Pa. 1972).
116. See, e.g., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. United Rubber Workers, 82 L.R.R.M. 2830
(M.D. Ga. 1972), aff'd, 476 F.2d 603 (5th Cir. 1973), citing Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co.,
370 U.S. 238 (1962). See also Local 787, Elec. v. Collins Radio Co., 317 F.2d 214, 216 (5th
Cir. 1963).
117. 370 F.2d 969 (3d Cir. 1967).
118. Id. at 971.
119. 393 F.2d 502 (1st Cir. 1968).
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conclusion. And, indeed, the United States Supreme Court has indi-
cated, in Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., 20 that an employer can-
not be compelled to arbitrate an alleged violation of a no-strike
clause under arbitration procedures which only permit employees
and not the employer to submit grievances.
Some unions contend that the decision of the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit in Los Angeles Paper Bag Co. v. Printing
Local 2121 is contrary to the above-cited cases. In Los Angeles
Paper Bag, the employer discharged twelve employees for allegedly
breaching a no-strike caluse. The employees denied that they had
committed a breach and filed grievances. The employer refused to
arbitrate, arguing that the grievances involved issues expressly ex-
cluded from the arbitration procedure under the collective bargain-
ing agreement. The union then filed suit to compel arbitration and
the only question before the court was whether the issues involved
were within the scope of the pertinent arbitration provisions. The
court did not consider the question of whether the latter provisions
were entirely employee oriented but only concluded that the issues
involved in the grievances fell within the scope of the arbitration
provisions in question. The case, in short, did not reach the essential
issue at stake here and, indeed, in a decision subsequent to Los
Angeles Paper Bag, the Ninth Circuit expressly recognized that
Atkinson was not applicable to a case which involved arbitration
procedures limited to employee grievances.'22 Several recent deci-
sions from other circuits have reached this same conclusion.'2 It is
therefore clear that an employer's damage claim under § 301 may
not be forced to arbitration where the arbitration procedures are
wholly employee oriented.
120. 370 U.S. 238, 241-43 (1962).
121. 345 F.2d 757 (9th Cir. 1965).
122. Howard Elec. Co. v. IBEW Local 570, 423 F.2d 164 (9th Cir. 1970). In Howard
Electric, the Ninth Circuit compelled arbitration on the ground that where doubt exists as
to the scope of a specific arbitration clause, that doubt should be resolved in favor of arbitra-
tion. In support of that conclusion, the Ninth Circuit cited, among others, its earlier decision
in Los Angeles Paper Bag. The court then stated: "By way of comparison, we cite Atkinson
• . . [as a case] holding that the employer was not required to arbitrate an alleged violation
of a no-strike clause. In [Atkinson], the grievance procedure was limited to employee griev-
ances. ... 423 F.2d at 167 (citations omitted).
123. See, e.g., Friedrich v. Local 780, IUE, 515 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1975); Faultless Div.,
Bliss & Laughlin Indus., Inc. v. Local 2040, IAM, 513 F.2d 987 (7th Cir. 1975); Affiliated Food
Distrib's Inc. v. Local 229, Teamsters, 483 F.2d 418 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 916
(1974).
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V. UNION RESPONSIBILITY
A. Presumption of Union Leadership
Given the right to sue for damages resulting from an illegal sym-
pathy strike, the next problem confronting an employer is to deter-
mine who is responsible for the damages. There is in labor law a
virtual presumption that mass illegal activity by union employees
is concerted union activity. It has long been accepted that employ-
ees do not engage in illegal strikes without leadership. In United
States v. UMW,'24 John L. Lewis, President of the United Mine
Workers, attempted to disclaim union responsibility for a simulta-
neous nationwide work stoppage in the coal mines by declaring that
the miners decided to strike "entirely of their own volition and
without any instructions from the President, direct or indirect."'' 5
The district court, however, stated:
[A]s long as the union is functioning as a union it must be held
responsible for the mass action of its members. It is perfectly
obvious not only in the objective reasoning but because of expe-
rience that men don't act collectively without leadership.'2
Despite this time-honored presumption of union responsibility for
illegal mass conduct of its members, the Fifth Circuit in a very
124. 77 F. Supp. 563 (D.D.C. 1948), aff'd, 177 F.2d 29 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S.
871 (1949).
125. 77 F. Supp. at 564.
126. Id. at 566. This presumption was followed in Textile Workers Local 120 v. Newberry
Mills, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 366, 373 (W.D.S.C. 1965), where the court stated:
The defendant has proved by the greater weight of the evidence that the plaintiff
participated, condoned, authorized and supported the strike by overt actions of the
Union in its official capacity.
The plaintiff did not upon receipt of notice from the defendant of the strike endeavor
to bring such strike to an end.
As long as a union is functioning as a union it must be held responsible for the mass
action of its members. It is perfectly obvious not only in objective reasoning but
because of experience that men don't act collectively without leadership. The idea of
suggesting that the number of people who went on strike would all get the same idea
at once, independently of leadership, and walk out of defendant's mill "is of course
simply ridiculous." A union that is functioning must be held responsible for the mass
action of its members.
Accord, Foam & Plastics Div., Tenneco Chemicals, Inc. v. Local 401, Teamsters, 90
L.R.R.M. 2147 (3d Cir. 1975); Eazor Express v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 520 F.2d
951 (3d Cir. 1975); Wagner Elec. Corp. v. Local 1104, Elec. Workers, 496 F.2d 954 (8th Cir.
1974).
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recent case, United States Steel Corp. v. UMW, 12 7 found no union
liability for a thirty hour illegal strike, stating that "it becomes the
burden of the Company in . . .an action for damages . ..to rea-
sonably satisfy the Court. .. that the Union has in some active way
made itself a party to the strike .... ,,128 It should be noted that
the United States Steel case differs factually from the precedent
cases in that the court might have been examining a true wildcat
situation. 29 Additionally, the stoppage itself was covered only by an
implied contractual no-strike provision, not an express one. For
those reasons the court appeared to proceed even further in the face
of precedent concerning a union's responsibility to discipline its
members and lead by example. Although stating that the "union
must effectively renounce its agents' actions if they participated in
an unauthorized strike," the United States Steel court held that
absent a contractual obligation to discipline it could not as a matter
of law impose such a duty upon the union.3 " This case is contrary
to the weight of authority in this area as established by other cir-
cuits, '3 district courts, 3 2 and the National Labor Relations Board.'33
The obligation of unions to discipline their agents and members
for unlawful acts arises from their authority to do so under their own
laws. The constitutiong of most international unions and the bylaws
of most local unions clearly provide that the unions have the power
to discipline recalcitrant striking employees, discipline and remove
officers of the local, try or fine members, and revoke the member-
ship of members engaging in unauthorized strike activity. The
courts reason that with authority comes the responsibility to exer-
cise it. The unions must strongly and affirmatively disavow illegal
strikes. A union's passive, do-nothing approach clearly implies that
it either acquiesced in or condoned the illegal activity of the striking
members or local. 3 4
127. 519 F.2d 1249 (5th Cir. 1975).
128. Id. at 1251, quoting the unreported opinion of the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Alabama.
129. Some local union officers participated in the strike but others did not.
130. 519 F.2d at 1255.
131. Riverton Coal Co. v. UMW, 453 F.2d 1035 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 915
(1972); NLRB v. Bulletin Co., 443 F.2d 863 (3d Cir. 1971); Teamsters Local 984 v. Humko
Co., 287 F.2d 231 (6th Cir. 1961).
132. See General Cable Corp. v. IBEW Local 1798, 333 F. Supp. 331 (W.D. Tenn. 1971);
Union Tank Car Co. v. Truck Drivers Local 5, 309 F. Supp. 1162 (E.D. La. 1970).
133. See Laborers Local 245, 219 N.L.R.B. No. 23, 90 L.R.R.M. 1126 (July 16, 1975).
134. Local 984, Teamsters v. Humko Co., 287 F.2d 231, 242 (6th Cir. 1961).
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In addition to the union's responsibility to discipline the striking
employees,'35 or repudiate the action of the strikers by telegram,
radio announcement, or otherwise, the officers of the local union
must take action to go to work themselves and thus lead by exam-
ple. 36
B. General Basis of Liability of the International Union
As a general legal principle, a union is responsible for the acts of
its officers and members under the doctrine of agency.'3 7 A union is
accordingly liable for an agent's conduct within the scope of his
authority, express or implied.'3 8 Through the law of agency an inter-
national union becomes liable for an unlawful strike called and
carried out by a local union if (1) some of the strike organizers or
participants as international affiliates were acting in their individ-
ual capacities as agents for the international, or (2) the local union
itself was acting as an agent for the international union. Even unau-
thorized acts can form the basis of liability if ratified by the interna-
tional union.' 39
The National Labor Relations Board, in interpreting § 2(13) of
the NLRA,'4 ° reaffirmed, in Carpenters Local 2067, "1 its approval of
the common law rules of agency. In the Carpenters case, the Board
held the union liable for the actions of its leaders who went through
the technical motions of disavowing the strike, including sending a
letter to the membership suggesting they return to work, but, most
significantly, did not order the strikers to return to work, made no
effort to discipline the strikers, and did not strongly and affirma-
tively disavow the strike. The apparent theory of the Carpenters
135. Union Tank Car Co. v. Truck Drivers Local 5, 309 F. Supp. 1162 (E.D. La. 1970).
136. General Cable Corp. v. IBEW Local 1798, 333 F. Supp. 331 (W.D. Tenn. 1971).
137. -Mason-Rust v. Laborers Local 42, 435 F.2d 939 (8th Cir. 1970).
138. American Zinc Co. v. Vecera, 338 Ill. App. 523, 531, 88 N.E.2d 116, 120 (1949): "A
union acts through its officers and agents; obviously, that is the only way it can act. It is
responsible for those acts even if not expressly authorized."
139. Carpenters Local 2067, 166 N.L.R.B. 532 (1967). See also Eazor Express, Inc. v.
International Bhd. of Teamsters, 520 F.2d 951 (3d Cir. 1975); Celotex Corp. v. United Steel-
workers, 388 F. Supp. 1132 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
140. 29 U.S.C. § 152 (13) (1970) provides:
In determining whether any person is acting as an 'agent' of another person so as to
make such other person responsible for his acts, the question of whether the specific
acts performed were actually authorized or subsequently ratified shall not be control-
ling.
141, 166 N.L.R.B. 532 (1967).
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case is that an international's reluctance to take disciplinary action
against either its local or the strike leaders and its failure to strongly
and affirmatively disavow the strike will lead the tribunal to con-
clude that the international attempted to, and did, benefit by its
agent's strike and is therefore responsible for the damages. An em-
ployer seeking to hold an international for the illegal acts of its local
or members thus must show the international's authority to control
that local or its members. This is usually done through an analysis
of the international's constitution and bylaws.'42
VI. RECOVERY OF DAMAGES UNDER §§ 301 AND 303
After ascertaining that a § 301 or § 30311 action will lie and
determining who would be the party or parties to respond in dam-
ages, the case must then be proven and the elements of damage
established. The first issue becomes whether one must meet the
clear proof standard, set forth in § 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act,
or the preponderance of evidence standard applicable to other civil
actions.
A. Burden of Proof
Although the standard of the burden of proof in § 301 and § 303
damage actions has been repeatedly litigated, courts have consis-
tently recognized that the preponderance of evidence standard, the
usual civil standard, is the one applicable.'" Nothing in the legisla-
tive history of § 301 supports an argument that Congress intended
to apply a higher burden of proof. Conversely, the Supreme Court's
decision in UMW v. Gibbs' recognizes that the clear proof standard
is not applicable to a § 301 or § 303 suit.'46 Indeed, in Ritchie v.
142. Local 984, Teamsters v. Humko Co., 287 F.2d 231 (6th Cir. 1961); New England Tel.
& Tel. Co. v. IBEW, 384 F. Supp. 752 (D. Mass. 1974); International Woodworkers, 140
N.L.R.B. 602 (1963).
143. 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1970). Damages relative to a § 303 action are included herein to
emphasize the situation that existed in Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. United Rubber
Workers, 82 L.R.R.M. 2830 (M.D. Ga. 1972), aff'd, 476 F.2d 603 (5th Cir. 1973), wherein the
same union had a contract with two different employers and engaged in a violation of both §
303 relative to a breach of the no-strike clause and § 303 relative to a secondary boycott.
144. See, e.g., Local 743, IAM v. United Aircraft Corp., 299 F. Supp. 877 (D. Conn. 1969);
IAM, Local 37 v. Higgins, Inc., 239 F. Supp. 252 (E.D. La. 1965); Textile Workers Local 120
v. Newberry Mills, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 366 (W.D.S.C. 1965).
145. 383 U.S. 715, 736-37 (1966).
146. Ritchie v. UMW, 410 F.2d 827, 833 (6th Cir. 1969); Riverside Coal Co. v. UMW, 410
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UMW,'4 7 the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit re-emphasized
that the clear proof standard of § 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act
does not apply to a finding of secondary boycott under § 303 of the
LMRA and that the employer was only "required to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the UMW was responsible
''148
B. Elements of Damages Recoverable in a § 301 or § 303 Suit
Since the primary consideration in a § 301 or § 303 suit is the
recovery of actual compensatory damages, it is necessary to analyze
in some detail those specific types of losses which have been held
directly attributable to the activities proscribed by § 303, or losses
resulting from a strike in breach of contract. In most of the reported
decisions, broad statements of general principles suffice to justify
components of the recovery. Such general principles, while a neces-
sary and convenient starting point, provide little guidance in decid-
ing upon the proper remedy in each individual case. In light of such
uncertainty, there can be no harm in asserting various elements of
damages even without actual case support, so long as factual causa-
tion can be reasonably established. The keystone is the broad stan-
dard stemming from the language of § 303 providing recovery for
"the damages by him sustained" and Senator Taft's statement that
this provision of the law was intended to "provide for the amount
of the actual damages.' ' 49
The measure of damages is the actual loss sustained by a com-
pany. 10 The items which can compose the "actual loss" are:
F.2d 267, 270 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 846 (1969).
147. 410 F.2d 827 (6th Cir. 1969).
148. Id. at 836.
149. 93 CONG. REc. 4872-73 (1947).
150. "Measure of loss," as stated in Wilson & Co. v. United Packinghouse Workers, 181
F. Supp. 809 (N.D. Iowa 1960), is:
In an action against a union under Section 301 for damages caused by a breach of a
no-strike provision in a contract, the measure of damages recoverable is the actual loss
sustained by the plaintiff as a direct result of the breach. . . .Such loss would be that
which may reasonably and fairly be considered as arising naturally from the particular
breach of contract involved and which may reasonably be supposed to have been in
the contemplation of the parties at the time the agreement was entered into in the
event of such violation.
Id. at 820-21 (citation omitted). Accord, Eazor Express, Inc. v. International Bhd. of Teams-
ters, 520 F.2d 951 (3d Cir. 1975).
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(1) overhead expenses 5' (standby) not compensated by prod-
uctivity (including overtime and excessive labor costs);
(2) loss of profits arising out of the breach;
(3) contract bonuses and penalties; and
(4) reasonable compensation for items of which the owner has
lost use due to the breach.
The same standard is applied in a § 303 suit. In Sheet Metal Work-
ers Local 223 v. Atlas Sheet Metal Co. ,5' the Fifth Circuit held that
overhead expenses are recoverable under § 303. That court allowed
recovery for:
(1) fixed overhead (especially utility bills) allocable to lost in-
come;
(2) costs of subcontracting;
(3) overtime for catching up to project schedules which was not
recouped in contract price;
(4) long distance telephone calls necessitated by picketing;
and
(5) salaries of employees who did not refuse to work to extent
rendered unproductive.'53
The courts have held that the term "overhead" included payments
to state workmen's compensation plans and straight line deprecia-
tion on trucks and equipment;'54 have allowed recovery for fair
rental value of machinery on a loss of use theory;' and have allowed
151. In United Elec. Workers v. Oliver Corp., 205 F.2d 376 (8th Cir. 1953), the court
defined overhead expense in the following fashion:
Overhead expense is the necessary cost incurred by a company in its operations which
can not be easily identified with any individual product and which by accepted cost
accounting procedure is spread over or allocated to the productive labor, which is labor
performed in the processing of the company's products. Such expenses do not fluctuate
directly with plant operations. They are expenses necessary to keep the company on a
going concern basis and are based upon the company's production which is planned
for a year in advance. They are constant regardless of fluctuations in plant operations.
When productive labor in a plant is reduced for any period to less than the normal,
the company sustains a loss in the expenditure of necessary overhead for which it
receives no production.
Id. at 387. See also United Steelworkers v. CCI Corp., 395 F.2d 529 (10th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 1019 (1969) (standby overhead expenses, even though having speculative
elements, recoverable when such elements proved by competent evidence).
152. 384 F.2d 101 (5th Cir. 1967).
153. Id. at 110.
154. W.L. Mead, Inc. v. Teamsters Local 25, 129 F. Supp. 313 (D. Mass. 1955), af'd, 230
F.2d 576 (1st Cir.), appeal dismissed, 352 U.S. 802 (1956).
155. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Shore, 132 Colo. 187, 287 P.2d 267 (1955);
accord, Wells v. Operating Eng'rs Local 181, 206 F. Supp. 414 (W.D. Ky. 1962).
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recovery of machine equipment rental necessitated by a strike as
well as the cost of extra business insurance. 5 ' The courts have also
allowed recovery, as overhead, of "hospital supplies, doctor services,
postage . . . and commissions.''197 The courts have further
awarded an employer, who was unable to fill orders for coal it would
have purchased for resale, the administrative expenses it would
have incurred in purchasing and reselling the coal.'58
While loss of profits is an element of recoverable damages, '19 there
is a special problem in seeking recovery of such losses. Most employ-
ers are reluctant to open themselves to discovery procedures in the
profits area, and the failure to provide sufficient documentation of
loss has led courts to refuse to find any damages caused by an illegal
strike.
In Textile Workers Local 120 v. Newberry Mills, Inc.,0 the court
held that the company was not entitled to damages since it failed
to present sufficient evidence. In Eazor Express, Inc. v. Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters,'' a case involving a sympathy
strike, the court rejected a claim for lost profits on the basis of
insufficient evidence." 2 An interesting aspect of the court's decision
was its review of the company's shareholder reports with respect to
156. American Potash & Chemical Corp. v. Pipefitting Local 714, 304 F. Supp. 1144 (N.D.
Miss. 1969).
157. Wagner Electric Co. v. Local 1104, IUE, 361 F. Supp. 647, 652 (E.D. Mo. 1973), aff'd,
496 F.2d 954 (8th Cir. 1974).
158. Riverton Coal Co. v. UMW, 453 F.2d 1035 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 915
(1972).
159. See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. CCI Corp., 395 F.2d 529 (10th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 1019 (1969); United Elec. Workers v. Oliver Corp., 205 F.2d 376 (8th Cir.
1953); Roadway Express, Inc. v. Teamsters Local 107, 299 F. Supp. 1058 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
160. 238 F. Supp. 366, 372 (W.D.S.C. 1965).
161. 520 F.2d 951 (3d Cir. 1975).
162. The district court had stated:
Here, as in the second example, plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that it would have
made a profit during the relevant period and this Court finds that it would not have.
Without such conclusive proof, lost profits are not compensable. In addition, plaintiff
seeks to recover what it terms 'consequential losses.' The company seeks to recover for
these consequential losses both as a separate item of damages and as an aspect of its
lost profits claim. That is, plaintiff contends that the consequential losses primarily
took the form of lost business and asks the Court to infer that had that business 'lost'
been regained, the company would have made a profit. This Court finds that neither
aspect of the consequential losses claim is compensable in this case. Plaintiff has failed
to carry his burden of proof that (a) the consequential losses for the years 1969 and
1970 were proximately caused by the August/September 1968 work stoppage or (b) that
the company would have made a profit, absent the strike, in 1968, 1969 or 1970.
376 F. Supp. 841, 846 (W.D. Pa. 1974) (footnote omitted).
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the lost profit issue. The court found significant the virtual absence
of any reference to the strike as a cause of the company's losses in
the shareholder reports. The court of appeals likewise referred to
these reports in affirming the district court's findings concerning
lost profits."5 3 This problem-the need for actual proof of damages
coupled with a desire to foreclose extensive discovery-requires
great care in drafting a lawsuit for damages. Within these guide-
lines, then, the elements of damages recoverable must be viewed on
a case by case basis." 4
VII. EMPLOYER'S RIGHT TO DISCIPLINE OR DISCHARGE EMPLOYEES FOR
REFUSAL TO CROSS A PICKET LINE
A question independent of an employer's entitlement to relief
from or for damage caused by a sympathy strike is what he may do
to discipline strikers and maintain production. The legal principles
involved in answering this question are similar to those previously
discussed but as a practical matter are usually litigated before the
National Labor Relations Board as the result of a union-filed unfair
labor practice charge.
Although the general policy of the Act, as interpreted by the
National Labor Relations Board and the courts, is an important
factor in an evaluation of the legal status of an employee who refuses
to cross a picket line, most frequently the terms of the particular
labor agreement are decisive in establishing the relative rights of the
parties in such situations.'65 The Board takes the position that in the
absence of specific provisions of a labor agreement prohibiting such
conduct, or in the absence of collective bargaining history wherein
an employer rejected a clause legitimatizing such activity, an em-
ployee's principled refusal' to cross a lawful picket line will be held
163. 520 F.2d at 967-68. The court of appeals likewise referred to these reports in affirming
the district court's findings concerning lost profits. Id. However, the international and the
local were held jointly responsible for over $665,000 in other compensatory damages occa-
sioned by the sympathy strike.
164. Although there is authority both supporting and denying the recovery of attorneys'
fees and punitive damages in § 301 and § 303 cases, treatment of that area of the law is beyond
the relevant scope of this article.
165. For a full analysis of § 7 rights of an employee to refuse to cross a picket line and
waiver of such rights, see Connolly, Section 7 and Sympathy Strikes: The Respective Rights
of Employers and Employees, 25 LAB. L.J. 760 (1974).
166. On the distinction between a "principled" refusal and one which is not, see NLRB
v. Union Carbide Corp., 440 F.2d 54 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 826 (1971).
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to be protected activity under § 7, and the disciplining or discharg-
ing of an employee on the basis of such a refusal will be held to
constitute an unfair labor practice.
A recent National Labor Relations Board case, Alliance Manufac-
turing Co.,"'87 dealt with the employer's right to discipline sympathy
strikers. The Board affirmed the decision of an administrative law
judge who had found that the employer did not violate the Act by
"issuing disciplinary notices, warnings, reprimands, suspensions,
terminations and/or layoffs to employees [members of Local 750]
who were absent from work because they chose to honor Local 174's
picket line."' 68 The decision of the administrative law judge was
based on a determination that the conduct of the employees vio-
lated their collective bargaining agreement, which included, in ad-
dition to mandatory grievance and arbitration provisions, both a
clause expressly stating that the agreement had been written to
eliminate lock-outs, strikes, slowdowns, and work stoppages of all
kinds, and a no-strike provision.'69 On the basis of these two contract
provisions and a bargaining history which suggested that the union
regarded the no-strike prohibition as a very broad one,"" it was held
that the no-strike clause covered all work stoppages, even those
having to do with issues that were not subject to the grievance and
arbitration procedure of the agreement. Therefore, it was con-
cluded, the conduct of the employees was in violation of the agree-
ment and the disciplinary action of the employer was permissible. 7'
Alliance, however, must be balanced with the Board's split decision
in Mosler72 where, over one member's strong dissent, the Board
found that a union's unsuccessful attempt to negotiate an expansion
of its right not to cross another union's picket line did not constitute
a waiver of a statutory right to engage in a sympathy strike.'73
167. 200 N.L.R.B. 697, 82 L.R.R.M. 1260 (1972).
168. Id. at 697, 82 L.R.R.M. at 1260. Local 174, a sister local of Local 750, consisted of
employees from another plant operated by the same employer.
169. Id. at 700, 82 L.R.R.M. at 1261.
170. The union had attempted to add some exceptions to the no-strike clause, but the
attempt was unsuccessful.
171. 200 N.L.R.B. at 700, 82 L.R.R.M. at 1261.
172. 217 N.L.R.B. No. 100, 89 L.R.R.M. 1201 (May 2, 1975).
173. Id. If the Second Circuit's decision in Buffalo Forge is reversed by the United States
Supreme Court, the National Labor Relations Board's rule of specific "inclusion" (see note
111 supra) as propounded in Gary Hobart and as applied in Mosler will of necessity have to
be reviewed and will most likely be rejected by the Board. Retention of such a rule would be
inconsistent with the Court's reversal of Buffalo Forge.
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There are, however, situations in which replacement of an em-
ployee striking in sympathy with others is permissible even though
his activity is protected. Considerations of these situations are
therefore essential to defining an employer's rights to fully respond
to a sympathy strike. The current position of the Board and most
courts has been to accord employees who refuse to cross a picket line
the same protection under § 7 of the Act as is available to primary
economic strikers. The results which flow from this conclusion have
been articulated in appellate court cases' 4 and the operative princi-
ple is stated quite clearly:
[U]nless the employer who refuses to reinstate [economic]
strikers can show that his action was due to "legitimate and
substantial business justifications," he is guilty of an unfair
labor practice. . . . The burden of proving justification is on
the employer.'
The Board's policy implementing this "legitimate and substan-
tial business justifications" test was expressly set forth in Redwing
Carriers, Inc. ' In that case, the employer discharged several em-
ployees for refusing to cross a picket line, reassigned other employ-
ees to perform their work, and hired some new employees. The
employer claimed that such conduct on its part did not constitute
an unfair labor practice because the action was necessary for the
continued operation of its business. The Board, although ruling that
the activity of the employees was protected concerted activity,
adopted the employer's contention that the discharges were not in
violation of the Act.'77 However, it must be observed that the
Redwing exception to the principle that an employer may not dis-
charge an employee for engaging in activity protected by the Act is
quite a narrow one. To illustrate, in Redwing the Board specifically
found:
[I]t is clear from the record that the employer acted only to
preserve efficient operation of his business, and terminated the
services of the employees only so it could immediately or within
174. See note 89 and text following supra.
175. NLRB v. Southern Greyhound Lines, 426 F.2d 1299, 1302 (5th Cir. 1970), quoting
NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., Inc., 389 U.S. 375, 378 (1967) (citation omitted).
176. 137 N.L.R.B. 1545 (1962), enforced sub nom., Teamsters Local 79 v. NLRB, 325 F.2d
1011 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 905 (1964).
177. 137 N.L.R.B. at 1548.
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a short period thereafter replace them with others willing to
perform the scheduled work .... "I
Although in subsequent cases the Board has purported to exam-
ine substance rather than form in applying its discharge-
replacement distinction as developed in Redwing, it is clear that in
the absence of prompt actual replacement of the discharged em-
ployee it is extremely difficult for an employer to establish the nec-
essary "legitimate and substantial business justifications."'7 In-
deed, most opinions citing the Redwing doctrine have done so for
the purpose of showing that the particular cases involved did not
come within the Redwing exception. NLRB v. Alamo Express,
Inc.,8 " and NLRB v. Swain & Morris Construction Co. " are exam-
ples of this, and the courts in these cases also articulated particular
factors which are to be weighed in applying the "legitimate and
substantial business justifications" test in the context of a discharge
for refusal to cross a picket line. In Swain & Morris, for example,
the court said:
The primary motivation for a discharge in a context such as
this is to be inferred from the totality of circumstances; the
declarations of the parties are not necessarily to be taken at
face value. . . .Among circumstances to be considered are
evidences of union animus on the part of those concerned, the
relative importance to the employer of the job which his em-
ployees have refused to do, the availability of alternate work
for the employees who find themselves faced with a picket line,
the ability of the employer to obtain other workers willing to
cross the line, etc. 8 '
The court in Alamo Express,'83 in applying the type of analysis
outlined in Swain & Morris, concluded that anti-union hostility
existed on the part of the employer.
These cases, and the references to the Redwing doctrine and the
"legitimate and substantial business justifications" test in many of
178. 137 N.L.R.B. at 1547 (footnote omitted).
179. See NLRB v. Union Carbide Corp., 440 F.2d 54, 57 (4th Cir.) (Bryan, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 826 (1971).
180. 430 F.2d 1032 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1021 (1971).
181. 431 F.2d 861 (9th Cir. 1970).
182. Id. at 862 (citation omitted).
183. 430 F.2d at 1036.
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the cases discussed earlier 8 ' indicate the obstacles an employer
must overcome in order to establish that the discharge of employees
who refused to cross a picket line was not in violation of the Act."'
As a result of these formidable barriers, the Redwing exception can-
not be relied upon with any assurance except in those situations
where actual replacements for the discharged employees will be
promptly hired to perform basically the same work which the dis-
charged employees refused to do.
VIII. SUMMARY
This article has attempted to outline as a practical matter the
current state of the law of sympathy strikes and the attendant rights
and obligations of both employers and unions. The dispute among
the circuits as to the breadth of the applicability of the "Boys
Markets injunction" will soon be resolved by the Supreme Court in
the Buffalo Forge case. The line of cases finding that sympathy
strikes are encompassed by the arbitration clause appears to be the
better reasoned opinion. These decisions not only avoid the abuses
of Norris-LaGuardia but also foster the national policy in favor of
arbitration. These cases, moreover, more clearly reflect the reality
of the situation in recognizing that, in fact, there is a disputed issue
as to whether or not union members have a right to refuse to cross
a picket line. Finally, these cases recognize that Boys Markets
remains applicable only where there is a dispute over a "grievance"
subject to a contractual grievance arbitration.
The unavailability of injunctive relief notwithstanding, an em-
ployer is entitled to damages for any injury resulting from an illegal
sympathy strike. However, the trend of the case law indicates that
refusal to cross a picket line will be considered a protected activity
unless this right has been "waived" in negotiations. The requisite
evidence to establish this waiver varies among the circuits. Once the
waiver has been found, liability can be placed on the union generally
184. See note 89 and text following supra.
185. The Redwing, Alamo Express and Swain & Morris cases lend further support to the
conclusion that the location of the picket line and relationship of the picketers to the employer
are not determinative factors affecting the right to refuse to cross a picket line. Both Redwing
and Alamo Express involved refusals to cross to make pickups or deliveries at another em-
ployer's premises, and Swain & Morris involved a refusal to cross to do work at a remote job
site.
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if it has not taken sufficient action to stop the illegal activities,
including disciplining its members. Further, the international may
be held liable for the illegal acts of its local, or members, through
the doctrine of agency. The company, in order to recover damages,
must meet the preponderance of evidence standard. However, the
matter of proof of the actual damages suffered may require the
company to bare more than it wishes and thus militate against
seeking recovery or, in fact, bar recovery.
Lastly, the employer does have the right to discharge the em-
ployee; however, this right is strewn with obstacles since legal sym-
pathy strikes are a protected activity. The National Labor Relations
Board will permit the replacement of sympathy strikers only on the
very limited basis of a showing of "legitimate and substantial busi-
ness justification."
